### 1

#### CIR will pass now but it will be tough

Nowicki, 10-30 -- Arizona Republic's national political reporter

[Dan, and Erin Kelly, "Fleeting Hopes for Immigration Reform," AZ Central, 10-30-13, www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20131029fleeting-hopes-immigration-reform.html?nclick\_check=1, accessed 10-31-13, mss]

However, reform backers point to encouraging signs in addition to the intense push by the business lobby. Key House Republicans, including Reps. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, Mario Diaz-Balart of Florida and Darrell Issa of California, reportedly are working on proposals to address the status of the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants who already have settled in the United States, which is the central issue for Democrats and immigration activists. The Democrat-controlled Senate on June 27 passed a sweeping reform bill that included a 13-year pathway to citizenship for immigrants who pass background checks, pay assessed taxes and fines and take other steps to get right with the law, as well as a massive investment in border security. There are indications that some Republicans are becoming impatient with the House inaction on piecemeal bills that have been talked about since the Senate bill passed. Two House Republicans — Reps. Jeff Denham of California and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida — have become the first two GOP lawmakers to sign onto a comprehensive immigration bill offered by House Democrats. Rep. Joe Heck, R-Nev., last week said in a written statement that the growing possibility that the House might punt on immigration reform in 2013 reflects “the leadership vacuum in Washington that rightly has so many people frustrated with this dysfunctional Congress.” Sen. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., a former 12-year House member who helped negotiate the Senate bill, said Monday on Twitter that momentum appears to be building in the House. “That’s good news for Arizona, and the country,” he said in the message. For their part, Boehner and his fellow House Republican leaders have not yet publicly declared immigration reform dead, which even the most pessimistic reform supporters say means there is still a chance the House could act in November or early December. House committees so far have approved five bills, including legislation to strengthen border security and require employers to use a federal database to ensure they are hiring people who are legally eligible to work in the United States. “The speaker said last week, ‘I still think immigration reform is an important subject that needs to be addressed. And I’m hopeful,’ ” Boehner spokesman Michael Steel told The Arizona Republic on Tuesday via e-mail. “He added that he supports a step-by-step immigration process.” Businesses speak out Hoping to make sure immigration reform gets on the House’s 2013 agenda, more than 600 business, law-enforcement, religious and political leaders from Arizona and nearly 40 other states flooded Capitol Hill on Tuesday. The fly-in was organized by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other groups, including FWD.us, which was founded by leaders of high-tech companies. The activists, mostly self-described conservatives, met with more than 100 members of Congress to urge them to take action on broad legislation that includes a way for most undocumented immigrants in the U.S. to earn citizenship. “In every corner of the Capitol, the energy these farmers, tech leaders, police chiefs and pastors brought to the Hill was palpable,” said Ali Noorani, executive director of the National Immigration Forum. “They brought a new perspective to the debate, one informed by what they see every day in their local businesses, churches and police stations — a broken system that has a negative impact on local communities nationwide.” Peoria Vice Mayor Tony Rivero is a conservative Republican who urged Arizona’s GOP congressmen to support reform this year. His city needs more farmworkers who are legally authorized to work, and it needs its undocumented residents to come out of the shadows, he said. “My message to our congressional delegation is that, as a constituent and a conservative Republican, I support a solution to this problem,” Rivero said. “We need to secure the border, identify the people who are here illegally and put them on a path to legality and put enforcement measures in place to make sure we aren’t here again in 10 years.” Former Phoenix Police Chief Jack Harris said he told members of Arizona’s congressional delegation that the current immigration system makes police officers’ jobs more complicated. “Every community is trying to solve the problem in a different way,” he said. “In some places, you (an undocumented immigrant) can get a driver’s license. In some places, you can’t. Some places are very liberal and report almost no crimes (committed by undocumented immigrants). Others deport you for just minor infractions. There’s great confusion among the law-enforcement community about what the rules are and what their authority is.” ‘I do care about them’ The conservative lobbying efforts are in conjunction with efforts from more liberal immigration-advocacy groups. Last week, a contingent of 44 undocumented immigrants and their supporters traveled from Phoenix by bus to Washington, D.C., and Ohio in hope of meeting with Boehner to persuade him to schedule a vote on a bill that includes a pathway to citizenship. The group, which included many “dreamers,” or undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as children, never got the opportunity to talk with Boehner. However, the immigration activists from the advocacy group Promise Arizona who camped outside Franks’ house did get the chance to talk with the representative for more than 25 minutes. They initially were buoyed by his response, which they interpreted as support for a pathway to citizenship. However, Franks later clarified to The Republic that he would not support a special pathway to citizenship. Franks said he would support legalizing undocumented immigrants under certain conditions but would not allow them to subsequently seek citizenship. Or the undocumented immigrants could return to their home countries and apply for green cards and citizenship that way, he said. Franks said he didn’t fully articulate his position to the activists because he felt compassion for their pleas. “Sometimes, in any situation, you don’t hit people in the face with the worst of it,” Franks said. “I wanted them to know, while maybe we didn’t agree on everything, there were some things we do agree on. I do care about them.” Proponents are positive Glenn Hamer, president and CEO of the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said the group of Arizonans that flew in as part of the U.S. Chamber-led D.C. visit were going to meet with all nine House members from Arizona. After morning meetings with Republican Reps. Paul Gosar, Matt Salmon and David Schweikert, Hamer said the sessions were positive. “There is complete agreement that we have a busted immigration system,” he said. “It’s fair to say that there is an understanding that we need immigration reform. It’s very clear that the House is going to pass its vision for immigration reform. If it’s simply the Senate bill or bust, then nothing will happen.” Flake said he believes the methodical and strategic lobbying by the business community, faith groups and activist organizations will **help** motivate the House. He said he is OK with House Republicans taking a step-by-step strategy rather than passing a comprehensive bill like the one he helped craft in the Senate. “My position is, if you can move it piecemeal or sequentially, that’s fine,” Flake said. “If you have to go comprehensive, that’s fine. Let’s get something to the president’s desk.” Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-reform organization America’s Voice, said the two House Republicans who signed on to the alternative Democratic bill also are examples of **momentum**. “When that bill was first introduced, it was widely panned as a Democratic ‘message bill’ that was going nowhere and was setting up the blame game in a run toward 2014,” Sharry said. “But because Democrats made the smart move of making sure every policy in the bill was passed with bipartisan support either in the Senate or the House, it has become a serious offering and a **place where Republicans can go.** I think you will see more Republicans getting on board.” Because of Boehner’s leadership style and uneasy relationship with many of his rank-and-file members, Sharry said, it may take “a convergence and emergence of a critical mass of Republicans to convince leadership to go forward.” Hamer said he believes there is still a possibility for compromise between the House and Senate. “I don’t want to be too Pollyannaish,” he said. “Passing immigration reform is not like renaming a post office. It’s going to be tough.”

#### Obama’s PC is key- but he’s using restraint

Nowicki, 10-25 -- Arizona Republic's national political reporter

[Dan, "Pleas from Obama may hinder immigration bill push," USA Today, 10-25-13, www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/25/obama-immigration-bill-partisanship/3188629/, accessed 10-31-13, mss]

One leading national champion of immigration change dismissed the idea that Obama should defer to House Republicans who dislike him. Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-reform organization America's Voice and an expert in immigration politics, said **the restraint** that **Obama has shown** thus far is testament to how badly the president wants a bill passed. For example, Obama has refrained from trying to punish Republicans politically for holding it up, he said. "Come on, he's the president. He gets to use the bully pulpit to try to set the agenda," Sharry said. "Obviously, it's only going to happen if the House Republicans decide to do it. Everybody in the world knows that everybody wants to get it done except for the divided House GOP." Another immigrant advocate called on Obama to show more leadership by curtailing his administration's "outrageous number of deportations" although such a step also could rile House Republicans. Some GOP lawmakers already have suggested they don't trust the Obama administration to properly enforce any new immigration or border-security laws that might be passed. "From our perspective, the president is definitely a big stakeholder and player in getting immigration reform done," said Cristina Jimenez, managing director of the immigrant-youth network United We Dream. "We don't believe that for the president to step up and push Congress to get this done undermines the efforts," she said. "But we also believe that the president himself could do more."

#### Plan drains PC – clout and raw political power

Martinez 13 – Political Science and History major, Deputy Supervisor, Councilman (Tony, “United States Cuba Relations – Why US Cuba Policy Does Not Change: Asymmetrical Absurdity”, US Cuba Politics, <http://www.uscubapolitics.com/2013/05/united-states-cuba-relations-why-us.html>, May 14, 2013)//PN

It’s the perennial chant, “when is U.S. Cuba policy going to change?” Well it is not going to change anytime soon unless those who really want to change it actually do what is required to change it. Similarly you have to ask yourself what is going on and hold those leading the charge accountable. Over the last decade we have seen many attempts to change U.S. Cuba policy beginning with lifting the travel ban. All have failed. Most recently, we have seen the efforts to remove Cuba from the Terror List, a designation that Cuba does not deserve and only serves to keep costs higher between the two countries, also fail. Conversely, we have seen the hand of the pro-embargo hardliners grow bigger and stronger. Legislation to expand Cuba travel is consistently blocked or thwarted in Congress. Funding for clandestine “Democracy” programs like the ones that got Alan Gross into a Cuban prison, still continue to be funded. The pro-embargo voting bloc raises money and elected six Members of Congress to be their vanguards on the floors of Congress. Their capacity to even reach into the White House, the Executive Branch, and establish themselves in gateway leadership positions in the Congress all speak to a well concerted political effort. Government officials and policy makers have to tow the hard line through the veiled and actual threats of holding up Presidential appointments or congressional funding. Intelligence and reason have taken a back slide to raw political power. Meet the consequences of distorted politics.

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers

Farrell 12/13/12 (Chris, a contributing editor for Bloomberg Businessweek. From 1986-97, he was on the magazine's staff, as a corporate finance staff and department editor and then as an economics editor. Farrell wrote Right on the Money: Taking Control of Your Personal Finances and Deflation: What Happens When Prices Fall? Among Farrell's many awards are a National Magazine Award, two Loeb Awards, and the Edward R. Murrow Award. Farrell is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Stanford University. “Obama’s Next Act: Immigration Reform” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/obamas-next-act-immigration-reform>)

Washington won’t get much of a reprieve from verbal pyrotechnics once the drama of the fiscal cliff is over. Up next: major immigration reform. President Obama has made it clear that a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s badly frayed immigration system is a second-term priority. Many Republican lawmakers are convinced the big takeaway from the 2012 election results is that conservatives need to rethink their hard-line stance on immigration—including illegal immigrants. Here’s what Washington should do before tackling the tough job of rewriting the immigration laws: Create a quicksilver path to citizenship for the 11 million to 12 million undocumented workers in the U.S. (excluding the small number convicted of violent crimes or multiple felonies). The shift in status acknowledges that these foreign-born newcomers, like previous generations of immigrants, overcame significant obstacles to come to the U.S. to make a better life for their families. Illegal immigrants are neighbors heading off to work, sending their kids to school, and attending church. Their everyday lives would vastly improve by moving from the shadows of society into the mainstream. More important from a public-policy perspective, the change would give a boost to the economy’s underlying dynamism. “What you’re doing in the short run is making it easier for workers to move between jobs, a relatively small effect,” says Gordon Hanson, a professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego. “The larger effect from eliminating uncertainty for these immigrants is creating incentives for them to make long-term investments in careers, entrepreneurship, education, homes, and community.” Let’s state the obvious: A rapid transformation of illegal immigrants into legal immigrants isn’t in the cards. Amnesty—let alone citizenship—is an anathema to large parts of the electorate. Too bad, since the scholarly evidence is compelling that immigrants—documented or not, legal or illegal—are a boon to the net economy. “Competition fosters economic growth,” says Michael Clemens, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington. The economic return from attracting skilled immigrants to the U.S. is well known. Foreign-born newcomers account for some 13 percent of the population, yet they are responsible for one-third of U.S. patented innovations. The nation’s high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, the Silicon Hills of Austin, Tex., and Boston’s Route 128 rely on immigrant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and employees. Better yet, economist Enrico Moretti at the University of California at Berkeley calculates that a 1 percent increase in the share of college-educated immigrants in a city hikes productivity and wages for others in the city. Less appreciated is how much the economy gains from the efforts of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal workers. Throughout the country, foreign-born newcomers have revived beaten-down neighborhoods as immigrant entrepreneurs have opened small businesses and immigrant families have put down stakes. Immigrant workers have played a vital role keeping a number of industries competitive, such as agriculture and meatpacking. Cities with lots of immigrants have seen their per capita tax base go up, according to David Card, an economist at UC Berkeley. Despite the popular impression that a rising tide of immigrants is associated with higher crime rates, research by Robert Sampson of Harvard University and others offer a compelling case that it’s no coincidence that the growing ranks of immigrants tracks the reduction in crime in the U.S. But don’t newcomers—legal and illegal—drive down wages and job opportunities for American workers? Not really. A cottage industry of economic studies doesn’t find any negative effect on native-born wages and employment on the local level. On the national level the research shows the impact on native-born Americans doesn’t drift far from zero, either positively or negatively. “In both cases, immigrants are more likely to complement the job prospects of U.S.-born citizens than they are to compete for the same jobs as U.S.-born citizens,” Giovanni Peri, an economist at the University of California at Davis, writes in Rationalizing U.S. Immigration Policy: Reforms for Simplicity, Fairness, and Economic Growth. The counterintuitive results reflect a numbers of factors. Immigrants expand the size of the economic pie by creating new businesses, new jobs, and new consumers. Middle-class families find it easier to focus on careers with affordable immigrant labor offering gardening, child care, and other services. Many illegal immigrants aren’t fluent in English, so they don’t compete for the same jobs as native-born workers. Another factor behind the lack of direct competition is the higher educational level of native-born Americans. In 1960 about half of U.S.-born working-age adults hadn’t completed high school, while the comparable figure today is about 8 percent. The real downside concern is on the fiscal side of the immigrant ledger. Yes, more taxes would go into Social Security, Medicare, and the like with legalization, but more people would qualify for Medicaid, welfare, and other benefits. At the local level, many school districts are strained financially from educating immigrant children, legal and illegal. That said, the prospect of fiscal costs would diminish as newly legalized immigrant workers move freely around the country seeking jobs, entrepreneurs are comfortable expanding their payrolls, and immigrant parents push their children to live the American Dream. “Over time, as entrepreneurs emerge and families are better able to get their kids through high school and college, you’re reducing the long-run fiscal claim of the group,” says Hanson. There is no economic evidence that making roughly 6 percent of the workforce illegal will benefit the economy. Plenty of research supports the opposite case. A fast track to legality offers Washington a rare twofer: a just move that’s economically efficient.

#### Economic decline risks multiple global nuclear wars

O’Hanlon 12 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan [“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” Los Angeles Times, July 10th, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon>, reading the purple]

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrainedin throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing globalpoverty through development aid, **moving toward a world free of** nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a muchmore urgent big-pictureissue:restoring U.S. economic strength.Nothing else isreallypossibleif thatfundamental prerequisite toeffectiveforeign policyis not reestablished.

### 2

#### The United States federal government should eliminate the enforcement of all restrictions on economic engagement between the U.S. and Cuba mandated by Cuba’s inclusion on the ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ list, other than restrictions related to U.S. arms sales to Cuba. The United States federal government should clarify that it no longer considers Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism, and that it retains legal restrictions related to such designation only as a means to restrain its own arms sales.

#### Competes---the CP doesn’t take Cuba off the list, it just eliminates all the economic restrictions that are caused by their inclusion on the list, other than the ban on arms sales.

#### Removing Cuba from the list would include lifting restrictions on U.S. arms sales

AP 13 – Associated Press, 3/23/13, “US on verge of momentous Cuba decision: Whether to take island off controversial terror list,” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/23/us-on-verge-momentous-cuba-decision-whether-to-take-island-off-controversial/

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry must decide within a few weeks whether to advocate that President Barack Obama should take Cuba off a list of state sponsors of terrorism, a collection of Washington foes that also includes Iran, Syria and Sudan.

Cuban officials have long seen the terror designation as unjustified and told visiting American delegations privately in recent weeks that they view Kerry's recommendation as a litmus test for improved ties. They also hinted the decision could affect discussions over the release of jailed U.S. subcontractor Alan Gross, whose detention in 2009 torpedoed hopes of a diplomatic thaw.

Inclusion on the list means a ban not only on arms sales to Cuba but also on items that can have dual uses, including some hospital equipment. It also requires that the United States oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions, among other measures.

#### Net-Beneficial---arms sales sustain global U.S. militarism and invisible structural violence---enforcing legal restrictions is key

Andrew Gavin Marshall 13, head of the Geopolitics division of the Hampton Institute, 3/26/13, “In the Arms of Dictators: America the Great… Global Arms Dealer,” http://andrewgavinmarshall.com/2013/03/26/in-the-arms-of-dictators-america-the-great-global-arms-dealer/

The American imperial system incorporates much more than supporting the occasional coup or undertaking the occasional war. Coups, wars, assassinations and other forms of overt and covert violence and destabilization, while relatively common and consistent for the United States – compared to other major powers – are secondary to the general maintenance of a system of imperial patronage. A “stable” system is what is desired most by strategic planners and policy-makers, but this has a technical definition. Stability means that the populations of subject nations and regions are under “control” – whether crushed by force or made passive by consent, while Western corporate and financial interests have and maintain unhindered access to the “markets” and resources of those nations and regions. Since the 19th century development of America’s overseas empire, this has been referred to as the “Open Door” policy: as in, the door opens for American and other Western economic interests to have access to and undertake exploitation of resources and labour.

As the only global imperial power, and by far the world’s largest military power, America does not merely rely upon the “goodwill” of smaller nations or the threat of force against them in order to maintain its dominance, it has established, over time, a large and complex network of imperial patronage: supplying economic aid, military aid (to allow its favoured regimes to control their own populations or engage in proxy-warfare), military and police training, among many other programs. These programs are largely coordinated by and between the Defense Department, State Department, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Arms sales are a major method through which the United States – and other powerful nations – are able to exert their hegemony, by arming and strengthening their key allies, directly or indirectly fueling civil wars and conflicts, and funneling money into the world’s major weapons manufacturers. The global economic crisis had “significantly pushed down purchases of weapons” over 2009 to the lowest level since 2005. In 2009, worldwide arms deals amounted to $57.5 billion, dropping 8.5% from the previous year. The United States maintained its esteemed role as the main arms dealer in the world, accounting for $22.6 billion – or 39% of the global market. In 2008, the U.S. contribution to global arms sales was significantly higher, at $38.1 billion, up from $25.7 billion in 2007. In 2009, the second-largest arms dealer in the world was Russia at $10.4 billion, then France at $7.4 billion, followed by Germany, Italy, China and Britain.[1]

There are two official ways in which arms are sold to foreign nations: either through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), in which the Pentagon negotiates an agreement between the U.S. government and a foreign government for the sale and purchase of arms, and through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), in which arms manufacturers (multinational corporations) negotiate directly with foreign governments for the sale and purchase of arms, having to apply for a license from the State Department.

### 3

#### “Engagement” requires increasing economic contacts in trade or financial transactions

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas. Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits. A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### The plan is appeasement – they are distinct

Times-Dispatch Staff 12 (Jan 22, “Cuba: Patsies,” <http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/cuba-patsies/article_5755996d-246f-5ca4-ada5-14b567a56603.html>, jkim)

The Obama administration's appeasement of the Castro regime in Cuba was meant to improve conditions there. Last January the White House eased travel restrictions. Near the end of the year it opened the door to a prisoner swap to exchange Bill Gross, an American falsely accused of spying, for Rene Gonzalez — who helped Cuba shoot down two civilian planes on a humanitarian mission in 1996.

Along the way the administration also offered to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and to cut back efforts at promoting democracy in the island gulag, among other things.

#### Substantial is that which grounds and shapes – not numerical minutiae. The primary substance that is the foundation for economic engagement toward Cuba is the embargo. The plan only changes an instance of the embargo – this is ACCIDENTAL NOT SUBSTANTIAL

Malaguti, 11 (Michael J., practices with the Concord firm of Ransmeier & Spellman, “Substantial Confusion: The Use and Misuse of the Word ‘Substantial’ in the Legal Profession,” August, 52 N.H.B.J. 6, p. l/n)

Aristotle's definies substance as "that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject." n25 By this, Aristotle is referring to what he calls "primary substance" - "the truest and most definite sense of the word." n26 Aristotle tells us that the individual man and the individual horse are both primary substances. n27 Individual instances of things are not predicable of a subject because an individual instance cannot be said of a subject. Put another way, it would be impossible for me to assert "Eric" of "John." n28 This follows from the proposition that "John" and "Eric" are individual instances. Additionally, "Eric" is not present in "John." That is, "John" is not characterized by "Eric-ness" but rather "John-ness." But primary substances are not the only substances. "Eric" and "John" themselves fall into broader categories of things. "Eric" and "John" are both "humans." n29 Pause for a moment to note why "human" is not a primary substance by applying Aristotle's definition. First, "human" is predicable of a subject. n30 It is possible to say that "Eric" or "John" is characterized by "human-ness." n31 It is also true that "humanness" is present in "Eric" or "John." Secondary substances, then, are "the species and genera of the primary substances - the kinds into which the primary substances fall." n32 One author's explanation helps concretize these concepts: Each individual entity has a primary "substance" (Greek: ousia). One sense of this term is that" [o]usia is what something is; the answer to the question 'What is F' tells us the ousia of F. In these cases it is rendered by 'essence' . . . . " This primary and individual substance (the particular individual, "Eric") underlies everything else, including and especially the "secondary" substances to which the individual belongs, in this case "man" and "animal." We see then that the particular entity "Eric" consists of an essential substance that makes him what he is. n33 It is from Aristotle's definition that we have received the word "substance" into the English language: "A [secondary] substance . . . is the essence (the 'what it is to be'), the form (morphe or eidos), of a [primary substance]. . . ." n34 Thus, the word substance "corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means 'being,' transmitted via the Latin substantia, which means 'something that stands under or grounds things.'" n35 Lastly, and most significant, is Aristotle's distinction between "substance" and "accident:" With respect to any substance, we can typically distinguish between properties that are essential for the thing to be the kind of thing it is and properties that are inessential (the accidents) . . . . An individual [\*8] diamond must consist of carbon in appropriate crystalline structure, and must have a scratch hardness of 10 on the Mohs scale - these are essential properties. But it may be large or small; white, blue, red, green or black; be set in a crown or other setting - these are accidental properties. n36 This illustrates what is meant when it is said that substance is "that which lies beneath." The accidental properties may come and go, but the substance, standing as it does beneath the accidental properties, remains. It is clear then that substance, as it was originally used, had nothing to do with size - a descriptive category that is embodied today in the most prevalent use of "substance." n37 The substance-accident dichotomy illustrates this perfectly. Something is "substantial" if it lies beneath - that is, if it is essential to making something what it is. Significantly, size was, to Aristotle, an accidental property. As Aristotle observed in Categories: Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, po-sition, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are "man" or "the horse", of quantity, such terms as "two cubits long" or "three cubits long", of quality, such attributes as "white", "grammatical". "Double", "half", "greater", fall under the category of relation; "in the market place", "in the Lyceum", under that of place; "yesterday", "last year", under that of time. "Lying", "sitting", are terms indicating position.; "shod", "armed", state; "to lance", "to cauterize", action; "to be lanced", "to be cauterized", affection. n38 It therefore would not have made sense to Aristotle to say, for instance, a "substantial amount," or a "substantial number," because such a statement rests on a conflation of substance and accident. To use the diamond example, the size of the diamond may change without affecting its "diamond-ness."

Prefer it

1) Limits – Allowing any other definition is unpredictable. Justifies lifting the embargo for any commodity – infinitely delimits

2) Ground – marginal changes to manifestations of the embargo NOT the embargo policy itself destroys negative link ground for trade DA’s and CP ground which also shifts the uniqueness debate

### 4

The plan kills the friend/enemy distinction – that causes war and extinction

Strong 7-Distinguished Professor of Political Science @ Harvard, PhD in Political Science @ Harvard [Tracy, Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate about Carl Schmitt, from The Concept of the Political, 2007, pg. xx-xxiii, DKP] Gender edited

In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt identifies as the "high points of politics" those moments in which "the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy." He suggests that this is true both theoretically and in practice. 36 There are two aspects of this claim worthy of note. The first is the semi-Hegelian form it assumes. The concrete recognition of the other as enemy and the consequent establishment of one's own identity sounds something like Hegel's Master and Slave, especially if read through a Kojevian lens. I suspect, in fact, that it is this aspect which led the SS journal Das Schwarze Korps to accuse Schmitt of neo-Hegelianism. 37 But only the form is Hegelian. There are two elements in Schmitt's claim about enemies which are not Hegelian. First is a suggestion that unless one is clear about the fundamental non-rationality of politics, one will likely be overtaken by events. Following the passage about the "high points of politics," Schmitt goes on to give examples of those who were clear about what was friend and enemy and those who were not. He cites as clear-headed some German opponents of Napoleon; Lenin in his condemnation of capitalism; and-most strikingly-Cromwell in his enmity toward Spain. He contrasts these men to "the doomed classes [who] romanticized the Russian peasant," and to the "aristocratic society in France before the Revolution of 1789 [who] sentimentalized 'man who is by nature good.' "38 The implication here is that rationality-what is rational for a group to do to preserve itself as a group-is not only not universal but hard to know. We are not far here from Alasdair MacIntyre's Whose Justice? Whose Rationality?39 The important aspect to Schmitt's claim is that it is by facing the friend-enemy distinction that we (a "we") will be able to be clear about what "we" are and what it is "rational" for "us" to do. Schmitt insists in his discussion of the friend-enemy distinction on the public nature of the categories. It is not my enemy but our enemy; that is, "enemy" is a political concept. Here Schmitt enlists the public quality to politics in order to prevent a universalism which he thinks extremely dangerous. The argument goes like this. Resistance to or the refusal to accept the fact that one's rational action has limitations determined by the quality of the identity of one's group leads to two possible outcomes. The first is that one assumes one shares with others universal qualities which must then "naturally" engender an ultimate convergence of interests attainable through negotiation and compromise. Here events are most likely not only to prove one wrong but to destroy a group that acts on such a false belief. (One thinks of Marx's caustic comments about the social-democrats in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon). This is the case with the "doomed" Russian classes and the "aristocratic society" of France. The other, more dangerous possibility is that one will claim to speak in the name of universal humanity. In such a case, all those by whom one is opposed must perforce be seen as speaking against humanity and hence can only merit to be exterminated. Schmitt writes: Humanity as such and as a whole has no enemies. Everyone belongs to humanity . . . "Humanity" thus becomes an asymmetrical counter-concept. If he or she discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of being human to a disturber or destroyer, then the negatively valued person becomes an unperson, and his life is no longer of the highest value: it becomes worthless and must be destroyed. Concepts such as "human being" thus contain the possibility of the deepest inequality and become thereby "asymmetrical.,,4o These words were written in 1976, but they were prepared for in the conclusion to The Concept of the Political: "The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity."41 Schmitt wants here to remove from politics, especially international politics but also internal politics of an ideological kind, any possibility of justifying one's action on the basis of a claim to universal moral principles. He does so because he fears that in such a framework all claims to good will recognize no limits to their reach. And, thus, this century will see "wars for the domination of the earth" (the phrase is Nietzsche's in Ecce Homo), that is, wars to determine once and for all what is good for all, wars with no outcome except an end to politics and the elimination of all difference.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s ethics of obligation and inclusion. Only endorsement of enmity opens political space for pluralization of political difference, ending the perpetuation of violence.

#### The war on terror is only possible by denying authentic relations of enmity between ourselves and the terrorist ---they have legitimate political grievances, so the proper solution is the alternative’s level political playing field that allows for the productive expression of opposition between “us and them”

Prozorov 6 – Sergei Prozorov, collegium fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Politics and Social Sciences, Petrozavodsk State University, Russia, 2006, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 75-99

The present hegemony of liberal ultra-politics is well illustrated by the contemporary phenomenon of the global ‘war on terror’. The ‘war on terror’ offers a fruitful site for inquiring into the politics of enmity for two reasons. First, the widely perceived undecidability of the category of ‘terrorism’ to the extent that it is frequently attributed to the very same states that have launched the ‘war on terror’ illuminates starkly the contingency of the friend–enemy distinction. This contingency, i.e. the absence of both essence and necessity to any particular empirical form of enmity, points to the permanent gap between the transcendental function of the friend–enemy distinction and its particular historical modality. The deployment of the ultra-political objectification of the enemy as a terrorist ‘rogue’ is a purely contingent option, made possible by a fundamental asymmetry that endows the subjects of the ‘war on terror’ with what Derrida terms the ‘reason of the strongest’, an epistemico-moral self-certitude that itself has something roguish about it: [T]hose states that are able or are in a state to denounce or accuse some ‘rogue state’ of violating the law, of failing to live up to the law, of being guilty of some perversion or deviation, those states that claim to uphold international law and that take the initiative of war, of police or peacekeeping operations because they have the force to do so, are themselves, as sovereign, the first rogue states. This is true even before any evidence is gathered to make a case against them, however useful and enlightening such a case may be. There are always (no) more rogue states than one thinks.70 Secondly and consequently, the ‘war on terror’ is of particular interest, insofar as the perception of this fundamental inequality is arguably constitutive of the very subject-position of the ‘terrorist’ foe. Indeed, contemporary terrorist violence may be grasped as a retort of the foe, a paradoxical refusal of the subject-position, imposed on the enemy of liberalism, through its assumption in a hyperbolic and excessive manner, whereby the foe ‘acts out’, with a vengeance, an identity attributed to him or her. Let us suggest that the specificity of terrorist violence is not derivative of extra-political factors that may function as its background motives (poverty, economic inequality, underdevelopment, lack of education, etc.), but is rather a direct expression of a properly political grievance, a retort against the humiliation, incurred in not being recognised as a legitimate enemy. Our demonstration of the monistic nature of liberal pluralism and the artefactual character of liberal naturalism points to the fact that the subject-position of the foe is preconstituted in the political ontology of liberalism, insofar as the appropriation of the capacity to adjudicate what is human and what, within humanity, is natural makes exclusion and stigmatisation a permanently available option for dealing with expressions of dissent. The image of the terrorist foe is thus both entirely contingent from the standpoint of a Schmittian transcendental function of enmity and always-already articulated within the ontological edifice of liberalism. While the motives for particular acts of terrorism might be distinct in each particular case, we may suggest that all these acts, first, take place in the preconstituted subject position of the ‘enemy of liberalism’ and, secondly, target precisely this subject position as a priori inferior. Terrorism is little more and nothing less than the resentful acceptance by the Other of the ultra-political terms of engagement, if only because there is no other way that the present global order can be legitimately opposed: the refusal to be liberalism’s ‘noble savage’ inevitably turns one into a barbarian. If our enemy can only be a monster, should we be surprised that the acts of our enemies are so monstrous? The uncanny effect of the liberal negation of pluralistic antagonism is that in the eyes of its adversaries liberalism may no longer be opposed other than by murderous and meaningless destruction. To the oft-cited empirical claims that contemporary terrorism has been produced as an effect of Cold War policies of Western powers, we must add a conceptual thesis: terrorism is the practical expression of that mode of enmity which the liberal West has constituted as the sole political possibility due to its appropriation of both nature and humanity. The ‘war on terror’ is not an accidental deviation from the maxims of Western liberalism but rather an exemplary model of the only kind of ‘war’ that the liberal foreclosure of political enmity permits, i.e. a war against an a priori ‘unjust enemy’. It should therefore not be surprising to see this model generalised beyond its original articulation, whereby it becomes a standard response to the worldwide expressions of anti-liberal dissent. For this reason, one gains nothing by attempting to battle terrorism either on its constitutive ultra-political terms or, as much of critical thought suggests, on the extra-political fronts of development, poverty relief, civic education, democratisation, etc. Instead, any authentic confrontation with terrorism must logically pass through the stage of questioning what confrontation, struggle and antagonism actually mean today, who we fight, how we fight and, possibly, whether we still have any meaningful willingness to fight. During the 1970s, Foucault frequently lamented that the proverbial ‘class struggle’ tended to be theorised in critical thought in terms of ‘class’ rather than ‘struggle’, the latter term functioning as a mere metaphor.71 The same problem is still with us today – the proliferation of metaphors (‘culture wars’, ‘wars on drugs’, ‘fight against poverty’) is increasingly obscuring the reflection on the concrete meaning of antagonism in contemporary political life. In the interbellum of the 1990s, one frequently encountered discussions of who the new enemy might be after the demise of the Soviet Union. As subsequent events have demonstrated, it is entirely redundant to attempt a theoretical deduction of the concrete enemy, which is after all always constituted in a political decision. However, while the ‘who’ question may be entrusted to history and politics, what requires reflection is a question of how enmity is to be managed. Should we maintain the present ultra-politics of the foe despite its evident boomerang effects on our societies, or should we attempt to return to the structure of ‘legitimate enmity’ of the Westphalian era, expanding it beyond the European system to the entire international society? Should we put our trust in and surrender our freedom to the governmental apparatuses of ‘homeland security’ or should we heed Schmitt’s warning that no security may ever be attained as long as our sense of the world is that in which there is ‘only a homeland’? This article has demonstrated that it is impossible to evade these questions by the plethoric yet repetitive discourse on overcoming enmity in the chimerical project of ‘world unity’ and that answers to these questions require an interrogation of many ontological assumptions that frame the conduct of modern liberal politics. We have seen that the desire to dispense with enmity as such, arising out of liberal epistemicomoral certitude, has not brought about a ‘universal friendship’ but rather produced a limited but universalistic community, which permanently feels threatened due to its incomplete embrace of the globe and, for the same reason, threatens everyone outside itself. The escape from the murderous ultra-politics of the foe is impossible unless it passes through the stage of an ontological critique of liberalism, hence the present importance of Schmitt.

### Case

#### Embargo is an alt cause to the AFF – that was CX

#### Reps of terror in the real world are accurate depictions – prefer scholars

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological** **problems**. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars** most associated with the critique of empiricismimplied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

**Consequences matter – the tunnel vision of moral absolutism generates evil and political irrelevance**

Issac, 2002 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, **an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: **(1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.** Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but **if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters**; **(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity** is not simply a form of powerlessness, it **is often a form of complicity in injustice.** This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and **(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives** of action, **that is most significant**. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, **it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil.** **This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic** and historically contextualized **ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment.** It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. **And it undermines political effectiveness.**

#### Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship

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(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism.Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method JacquesDerrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics,politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies. In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted politicalcontemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also alwaysin danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring atand enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account ofabsolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom todaypointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

#### Ideology breeds terrorism and will continue to indefinitely – only way to prevent future acts of violence is hard-line militarism by the United States

Alex Epstein, Graduate of Duke University, BA Philosophy, Junior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, “Fight the Root of Terrorism With Bombs, Not Bread,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 2005, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11243,

The pernicious idea that poverty causes terrorism has been a popular claim since the attacks of September 11. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeatedly asked wealthy nations to double their foreign aid, naming as a cause of terrorism "that far too many people are condemned to lives of extreme poverty and degradation." Former Secretary of State Colin Powell agrees: "We have to put hope back in the hearts of people. We have to show people who might move in the direction of terrorism that there is a better way." Businessman Ted Turner also concurs: "The reason that the World Trade Center got hit is because there are a lot of people living in abject poverty out there who don't have any hope for a better life." Indeed, the argument that poverty causes terrorism has been central to America’s botched war in Iraq--which has focused, not on quickly ending any threat the country posed and moving on to other crucial targets, but on bringing the good life to the Iraqi people. Eliminating the root of terrorism is indeed a valid goal--but properly targeted military action, not welfare handouts, is the means of doing so. Terrorism is not caused by poverty. The terrorists of September 11 did not attack America in order to make the Middle East richer. To the contrary, their stated goal was to repel any penetration of the prosperous culture of the industrialized "infidels" into their world. The wealthy Osama bin Laden was not using his millions to build electric power plants or irrigation canals. If he and his terrorist minions wanted prosperity, they would seek to emulate the United States--not to destroy it. More fundamental, poverty as such cannot determine anyone's code of morality. It is the ideas that individuals choose to adopt which make them pursue certain goals and values. A desire to destroy wealth and to slaughter innocent, productive human beings cannot be explained by a lack of money or a poor quality of life--only by anti-wealth, anti-life ideas. These terrorists are motivated by the ideology of Islamic Fundamentalism. This other-worldly, authoritarian doctrine views America's freedom, prosperity, and pursuit of worldly pleasures as the height of depravity. Its adherents resent America's success, along with the appeal its culture has to many Middle Eastern youths. To the fundamentalists, Americans are "infidels" who should be killed. As a former Taliban official said, "The Americans are fighting so they can live and enjoy the material things in life. But we are fighting so we can die in the cause of God." The terrorists hate us because of their ideology--a fact that filling up the coffers of Third World governments will do nothing to change. What then, can our government do? It cannot directly eradicate the deepest, philosophical roots of terrorism; but by using military force, it can eliminate the only "root cause" relevant in a political context: state sponsorship of terrorism. The fundamentalists' hostility toward America can translate into international terrorism only via the governments that employ, finance, train, and provide refuge to terrorist networks. Such assistance is the cause of the terrorist threat--and America has the military might to remove that cause. It is precisely in the name of fighting terrorism at its root that America must extend its fist, not its hand. Whatever other areas of the world may require U.S. troops to stop terrorist operations, we must above all go after the single main source of the threat--Iran. This theocratic nation is both the birthplace of the Islamic Fundamentalist revolution and, as a consequence, a leading sponsor of terrorism. Removing that government from power would be a potent blow against Islamic terrorism. It would destroy the political embodiment of the terrorists' cause. It would declare America's intolerance of support for terrorists. It would be an unequivocal lesson, showing what will happen to other countries if they fail to crack down on terrorists within their borders. And it would acknowledge the fact that dropping bombs, not food packages, is the only way for our government to attack terrorism at its root.

#### If terrorist insecurity is inevitable then ONLY the strategic security focus can prevent disproportionate state response

Lake ‘2 David A. Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century” Dialog-IO, Spring 2002, pp. 15–29 © 2002 by the IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, <http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/INOR/Dialogue_IO/lake1.pdf>

**Many factors affect the likely response to a terrorist attack. Key to any choice**, however, **is a central tradeoff between success and what might be called support. The larger the response, the more likely it is to succeed in eradicating the terrorists** and deterring future attacks. **But at the same time the larger the response, the more likely it is that moderates will be radicalized, either because of the collateral damage they suffer or because they infer that the target itself is more extreme than they previously believed and is willing** and able to use force **to impose a solution they cannot accept**. In other words, the larger the response, the more support the target will likely lose. This implies that there is some optimal response that balances the prospects for success against the loss of support for the target. Managing this tradeoff can be tricky, of course. By restraining its response, the target runs a larger risk of failure and, thus, future attacks. **By retaliating strongly**, however, **the target risks radicalizing moderates and plays into the hands of the extremists, ultimately expanding their support and power. Disabling the extremists while limiting damage to the moderates may be difficult, if not impossible.** Indeed, the terrorists count on this. In terms of the model, the target must increase a, making the costs of violence to the terrorists higher, while lowering (or at least not increasing) p. The response of the target is, thus, clearly endogenous as well, and this is where the simple formalization and intuition discussed earlier becomes incomplete. This is also an area where a more formal model promises significant insights. **The important point here,** however, **is that the tradeoff between success in eliminating terrorism and sustaining political support for the target is real and binding. This leads to an even more important conclusion: in the fight against terrorism, some measure of restraint can be wise policy.** “More” is not necessarily better but may, in fact, erode support for the target. This further implies that in the fight against terrorism, as elsewhere, the quest for absolute security is a chimera**.** Through massive uses of force, targets might eliminate terrorism. However, this would not only require a considerable investment of resources but also alienate moderates and undermine support for the target throughout the international community. **States must learn to live with some risk of terrorism for the indefinite future.**

#### Their scholarship is bankrupt -- reject it

Jones and David ‘9 Martin and Smith, M. L. R.(2009)'We're All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on”

Terrorism?',Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,32:4,292 — 302, April

Nevertheless, **the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position.** Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37–49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed ‘problem-solving’ terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42). Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17–25), considers British government–induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22–23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27–36), find the War on Terror constitutes “*the* single,” all embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (original italics) (pp. 28–29). **The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby *lack* turns to *excess*”** (original italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65–79), reiterates Richard Jackson’s contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76). **Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy *petitio principii*. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry. Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline.** Jackson and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in ‘terrorist’ activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of *Meibion Glyndwr* who would as a matter of principle avoid *pob sais* like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that ***Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and *Jemaah Islamiyah*.**

#### Method focus causes scholarly paralysis

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(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to worry endlessly about foundational assumptions**.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. Hirschman (1970b, 338) noted this very danger, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the focus on producing internally consistent packages of assumptions instead of actually examining complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis. Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles as uniquely scientific, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a firmer scientific footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but only after the fundamentals have been soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.